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Amendment of IAS 39 by the IASB in 2008 provided an option to reclassify investments from fair value 
to historical cost. Whereas this option was available to all firms, it was particularly relevant to banks. We 
predict that “too important to fail” (TITF) banks took less advantage of this option than non-TITF banks 
because the political protection they enjoyed insulated them from regulatory pressure. Banks that did not 
enjoy this protection had greater reason to make use of the option to reclassify since doing so would 
protect their Tier 1 capital. As predicted, findings reveal that TITF banks made less use of the 
reclassification option to protect their Tier 1 capital and that there is a significant moderating influence of 
TITF status on the incentive to reclassify investments for banks with lower regulatory capital. This 
finding is consistent with TITF banks placing less weight on protecting regulatory capital than non-TITF 
banks, and thereby retaining flexibility to sell assets. Taken together, our findings provide evidence that 
accounting choices made by managers are affected by the importance of their firms to the economies in 




Key words: Too Important to Fail, Fair Value Accounting, Bank Regulation, Financial Crisis 
 





The accounting policy decision in 2008 by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
to permit firms to reclassify retroactively investments from fair value to historical cost categories was one 
element of a set of policy responses to prevent the collapse of the financial sector. With respect to banks, 
reclassifying investments had the potential to relieve regulatory pressure and insulate them from exposure 
to any future losses. Prior research finds that European banks that did reclassify were more likely to be 
capital constrained than banks that did not. However, many banks that chose not to reclassify were 
apparently similarly capital constrained as those that reclassified, which suggests that there are other costs 
and benefits of reclassification that affect banks’ accounting choices.  For example, two such costs are (i) 
restrictions on selling assets reclassified to other than fair value categories, and (ii) a foregoing of 
recognition of any future fair value gains. 
We focus in this study on whether the accounting choice to reclassify is affected by whether a 
bank enjoys protection from intervention by bank regulators (regulatory forbearance) as well as taxpayer 
protection in the event it requires an injection of capital. Some banks enjoy such protection because they 
are deemed to be “too big to fail” (TBTF). Other banks enjoy similar protection by virtue of being located 
in countries where, history suggests, no bank will be allowed to fail, regardless of its size. We label banks 
that are either TBTF or are domiciled in “no-fail” countries as “too important to fail” (TITF).  We 
hypothesize that because TITF banks were more likely to enjoy taxpayer protection and regulatory 
forbearance in the event of a regulatory capital shortfall, the incentive in 2008 to reclassify investments to 
protect regulatory capital was less for TITF than for non-TITF banks. 
To address our hypothesis, we examine the reclassification choices for a sample of 160 bank holding 
companies from 30 European countries in which IFRS is applied. For banks in all such countries, 
reclassification from the fair value category “held for trading” (HFT) to the cost categories, “loans and 
receivables” and “held to maturity” (LAR/HTM) brought an immediate benefit of increasing regulatory 
capital. Whether a bank obtained such a benefit when it reclassified an HFT investment to the “available 
for sale” (AFS) category depended on whether it was domiciled in one of the 11 countries in which a 
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“prudential filter” was applied to losses on AFS debt investments, thereby removing such losses from the 
primary regulatory capital measure, “Tier 1” capital. If it were one of the 50 banks domiciled in a 
prudential filter country, it would have an incentive to reclassify from HFT to either AFS or LAR/HTM 
to avoid recognition of fair value losses when computing its Tier 1 capital. For the 110 banks that were 
domiciled in the 19 countries in which a prudential filter was not applied, regulatory relief could be 
obtained only if investments in the fair categories, HFT and AFS, were reclassified to the cost categories, 
LAR/HTM. 
To test our prediction that TITF status affected banks’ accounting choices to reclassify investments, 
we utilize each bank’s reclassification information, whether it is domiciled in a prudential filter country, 
the extent of its Tier 1 capital position, and whether it has TITF status.  Specifically, we estimate a probit 
regression in which the dependent variable, RECLASS, takes on the values 0 or 1.  For a bank in a 
prudential filter country, RECLASS equals 1 if it reclassified a material proportion of investments from 
HFT to either AFS or LAR/HTM, and 0 otherwise. For a bank in a non-prudential filter country, 
RECLASS equals 1 if it reclassified a material proportion of investments from either HFT or AFS to 
LAR/HTM, and 0 otherwise. RECLASS is a composite variable that captures the different ways the three 
reclassification choices affect regulatory capital, the simultaneity of reclassification choices, and country 
differences in prudential filters. The key explanatory variables are an indicator variable for whether a 
bank is a TITF bank, a bank’s pre-reclassification level of regulatory capital, and the interaction of TITF 
with regulatory capital. The TITF measure we employ is intended to reflect the ex ante belief of a bank’s 
managers that the bank enjoys taxpayer protection and regulatory forbearance. 
The findings are consistent with our prediction that there is a significant moderating influence of 
TITF status on the incentive to reclassify investments for banks with lower regulatory capital. Indeed, we 
find that while a small marginal change in regulatory capital has a between five- and seven-fold decrease 
in the probability of reclassification for non-TITF banks, there is no effect on the reclassification choice 
for TITF banks. To focus more directly on the effect of TITF status on the tradeoff banks make between 
protecting regulatory capital and retaining flexibility to sell assets, we examine the reclassification 
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choices made by the subsample of banks from non-prudential filter countries that reclassify out of HFT.  
We find that TITF banks are more likely to reclassify out of HFT into AFS than non-TITF banks, which 
is consistent with TITF banks placing more weight on retaining flexibility to sell the assets rather than 
protecting their regulatory capital. 
We conduct additional analyses to address concerns that there are other factors correlated with TITF 
status that determine the reclassification choice, thereby creating econometric identification problems and 
threatening the validity of the TITF construct. A primary concern is that TITF and non-TITF banks have 
different asset compositions. To allow for the possibility that the reclassification choice could be affected 
by banks’ asset compositions, we estimate the probit model including controls for the following: the 
extent to which banks use derivative assets for hedging purposes; whether they exercise the fair value 
option for liabilities; the extent to which fair value measurements are based on Level 3, the most 
subjective measurement category; and the extent of their holdings of crisis-sensitive assets such as asset-
backed securities. Our inferences are unaffected by the inclusion of these and other additional variables.  
Another concern is that because TITF status is, by construction, correlated with bank size, bank size is a 
correlated omitted variable. We address this concern in two ways. First, we include bank size as a control 
variable in our probit regressions. Second, to allow for the possibility that the size effect is nonlinear, we 
estimate our probit model replacing TITF with an indicator variable for whether a bank’s assets are above 
or below the sample median. Findings indicate that the size indicator has neither a direct effect on the 
reclassification choice nor an indirect effect through the interaction with regulatory capital. A related 
concern is that because some TITF banks are domiciled in “no-fail” countries, TITF status is correlated 
with unobserved country-level characteristics. To address this concern, we estimate our probit model 
including country fixed effects and find that doing so has no effect on our inferences regarding the 
influence of TITF status on the reclassification choice. A final factor we consider is whether TITF banks 
chose to protect regulatory capital through loan loss provisioning rather than through reclassification of 
investments. However, findings reveal that TITF banks did not have smaller discretionary loan loss 
provisions in 2008 than non-TITF banks. 
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Prior research provides evidence that many banks took advantage of the option to reclassify 
investments retroactively in 2008 to improve their reported regulatory capital. Our study extends this 
work by providing evidence that TITF status moderated the influence of Tier 1 regulatory capital in 
affecting a bank’s reclassification choices. More importantly, our study provides evidence that accounting 
choices made by managers of one particular type of firm, banks, are affected by the importance of their 
firms to the economies in which they are domiciled. In particular, whereas non-TITF banks’ accounting 
choices were largely influenced by regulatory concerns, by virtue of their unique status, TITF banks were 
relatively free from regulatory concerns when making accounting choices, thereby permitting them to 
place more weight on retaining flexibility to sell the assets rather than protecting their Tier 1 regulatory 
capital. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional background 
and surveys related literature. Section 3 provides our predictions and estimating equations, and Section 4 
describes the data and sample. Section 5 presents our findings, Section 6 provides additional analyses, and 
Section 7 concludes the study. 
 
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE 
2.1 Institutional Background 
The origins of the Financial Crisis were numerous and resulted in many policy responses.
1
 The 
policy response that is relevant to our study resulted from the pressure that was placed on accounting 
standard setters to make it easier for banks to reduce the probability of regulatory capital violations by 
simply changing the accounting for financial investments. IAS 39 divides investments into four 
categories: held for trading (HFT), available for sale (AFS), loans and receivables (LAR), and held to 
maturity (HTM). HFT securities are measured at fair value, with gains and losses recognized in income 
                                                          
1
 The policy fixes included a call for increasing bank capital ratio requirements, restrictions on investments and 
trading, particularly derivatives, and changes in disclosure requirements. 
 7 
and hence accumulated in retained earnings.
2
 AFS securities are also measured at fair value, but with 
gains and losses recognized in other comprehensive income (OCI) and hence retained as a component of 
accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI). LAR and HTM are measured at amortized cost, with 
gains and losses only recognized in income when realized.  
The different ways in which fair value gains and losses of investments are treated for accounting 
purposes can have significant economic effects on banks as a consequence of the way in which regulatory 
capital is computed under the Basel II Accords (BCBS, 2006). The Basel Accords specify minimum 
capital requirements that are intended to capture a bank’s risk of economic loss. A key regulatory capital 
requirement is that banks must maintain a specified Tier 1 capital ratio, which is defined as the ratio of 
Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets.
3
  
The starting point bank regulators use in determining Tier 1 capital is the book value of common 
equity and other claims with equity-like features, such as qualifying perpetual preferred stock and 
minority interest, as defined by the relevant accounting standard setter. Typical adjustments that 
regulators make to arrive at Tier 1 capital include subtracting unrealized gains on AFS securities, 
goodwill, and intangible assets. For equity securities, unrealized gains (losses) are always excluded from 
(included in) the calculation of Tier 1 capital. Whether Tier 1 capital includes losses on AFS debt 
securities depends on whether the country in which a bank is domiciled applies a prudential filter to 
unrealized losses on such instruments (CEBS, 2007). In countries in which this prudential filter is applied 
(i.e., prudential filter countries), unrealized losses are excluded from Tier 1 capital, but they are not 
                                                          
2
 There is actually a third category of investments recognized at fair value, namely those investments that a firm 
elects to recognize at fair value based on application of the fair value option (FVO). As with HFT investments, fair 
value gains and losses are recognized in income. An important difference between investments in this third category 
and HFT investments is that the former are precluded by IFRS from being reclassified into AFS or LAR/HTM. 
Although investments recognized at fair value based on application of the FVO cannot be reclassified, the extent to 
which a bank makes use of the FVO can, in principle, affect our inferences. We address this issue in section 6.1. 
3
 During our sample period and in all our sample countries, the Tier 1 capital ratio had to be at least 4%. In practice, 
banks typically maintain a target capital position above the required minimum as protection against economic 
shocks that would reduce their Tier 1 capital below the 4% level. The Financial Crisis represented an economic 
shock that was of a magnitude and character that was unprecedented in modern times. In such a situation with 
heightened volatility and fall in asset prices, bank managers likely changed their beliefs as to what constituted an 
adequate Tier 1 capital cushion. 
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excluded in countries in which the prudential filter is not applied (i.e., non-prudential filter countries). 
Unrealized gains are always excluded regardless of whether the country applies a prudential filter. In all 
30 countries in which our sample banks are domiciled, cumulative unrealized gains (losses) on HFT 
securities increase (decrease) Tier 1 capital. Thus, the way in which investments are classified for 
financial reporting purposes can have an effect on Tier 1 capital, and hence, can have real economic 
effects associated with the potential for regulatory intervention. 
 
The accounting rule change introduced by the IASB provided an option for firms to change 
selectively the accounting measurement basis for investments, which were already permitted under US 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in rare circumstances (IASB press release, 13 October 
2008).  In particular, the IASB amended IAS 39 to give firms the option to reclassify investments across 
categories by allowing reclassification (i) out of HFT into either LAR or HTM, (ii) out of HFT into AFS, 
and (iii) out of AFS into either LAR or HTM. The amendment provided for retroactive reclassification, 
effectively permitting firms to rewrite history during the period between the release of second and fourth 
quarter 2008 financial statements. Thus, the rule change permitted banks that reclassified investments to 
appear to be more financially sound, thereby reducing the pressure on politicians to require banks to shore 
up their finances (Acharya and Ryan, 2016). Although one motivation for the accounting rule change was 




There are costs and benefits of reclassifying investments. In prudential filter countries, the primary 
benefit of reclassifying from HFT to AFS or LAR/HTM that banks obtain is that reclassifications reduce 
the prospect of future decreases in Tier 1 capital. Other things equal, such reclassifications reduce 
                                                          
4
 A similar situation occurred in the US in the 1990s, when pressure from technology firms, primarily in California’s 
Silicon Valley, resulted in the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) changing the requirement to recognize 
employee stock expense in income. The resulting standard, SFAS 123 (FASB, 1995), which required only disclosure 
of earnings adjusted for the effects of employee stock option expense, was applicable to all firms, not just those in 
the technology sector. 
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regulatory pressure on a bank to improve its Tier 1 capital position in ways it deems to be unnecessarily 
costly (e.g., selling assets or raising additional equity). An additional benefit stems from the fact that there 
likely is less pressure to recognize impairments that are detrimental to Tier 1 capital for assets classified 
as LAR/HTM rather than as HFT or AFS. A bank likely faces greater difficulty convincing its auditor 
there is no need to recognize an impairment if it is an investment that might be sold before maturity. In 
non-prudential countries, such benefits only obtain for reclassifications from HFT or AFS to LAR/HTM. 
For banks in prudential filter countries, a cost of reclassifying an investment from HFT to LAR/HTM 
rather than from HFT to AFS is that banks face scrutiny from auditors that might constrain future sales of 
the reclassified assets. The amended IAS 39, paragraph 50, states that an asset may be reclassified “...if 
the entity has the intention and ability to hold the financial asset for the foreseeable future or until 
maturity (IASB 2008a).”  IFRS provides no specific guidance regarding what constitutes the foreseeable 
future, and neither do any of the large international accounting firms. However, in their 2008 annual 
reports, Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Postbank, and Royal Bank of Scotland indicate that they interpret 
“foreseeable future” as a one-year period from the reclassification date. In addition, we have been given 
confidential access to the internal accounting policy manual of a large international bank, which interprets 
the “foreseeable future” also as a one-year period from the reclassification date. Thus, banks that 
reclassify investments from HFT to LAR/HTM likely forego the opportunity to benefit by realizing near 
term future gains from sale. For banks in non-prudential filter countries, there is no regulatory benefit of 
reclassifying from HFT to AFS and there is the cost of being unable to sell investments in LAR/HTM.
5
 
The costs and benefits of reclassifying differ for TITF and non-TITF banks because of their different 
treatment by the government. Should a particular TITF bank get into difficulty, it can be reasonably 
confident that the government will bail it out; a non-TITF bank has no such assurance. This potential 
                                                          
5
 Although IAS 39 does not define “foreseeable future,” it is reasonable to assume that it would have constrained 
banks that reclassified assets from making sales out of the LAR/HTM in early 2009. We have examined the 2009 
financial statements of our sample banks that reclassified investments and found very few appeared to sell 
investments in 2009. For example, by the middle of 2009, only 4 sample banks had sold or settled investments from 
any category. Therefore, hindsight does not provide evidence that banks regarded the “foreseeable future” selling 
constraint as being without force.  
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injection of taxpayer capital can be viewed as a put option TITF shareholders enjoy, at little or no cost, an 
option that effectively guarantees that reductions in the value of bank assets will be offset by a 
corresponding rise in the value of the put option. Hence, TITF banks have an incentive to hold riskier 
assets than non-TITF banks because the more volatile the assets they hold in their portfolio, the more 
valuable is the implicit guarantee (Acharya and Steffen, 2015; Lucas and McDonald, 2009; Merton, 
1977). In addition, regulators will be more circumspect in pressuring TITF banks to increase their capital, 
i.e., these banks enjoy greater political protection that results in regulatory forbearance at little or no cost. 
This benefit they enjoy stems from their relative importance to the health of the overall economy, and 
consequently their generally greater influence with political policy makers (Goldman et al., 2009). 
As a result of their special treatment, TITF banks have less reason to worry about the potential for 
fair value losses to generate regulatory interventions that might result in their being forced out of 
business. In contrast to other banks, TITF banks that face financial difficulties are likely to receive 
taxpayer support in the form of bailouts. This special treatment is not entirely costless. For example, TITF 
banks that receive such support may face greater scrutiny from regulators, damaging publicity, and senior 
managers may lose their jobs. However, the benefits of reclassification are likely to be lower for TITF 
than non-TITF banks because TITF banks enjoy greater regulatory forbearance in the event of a 
regulatory capital shortfall. Thus, other things equal, TITF banks in prudential filter (non-prudential filter) 
countries have a lower incentive to reclassify investments out of HFT (HFT or AFS).  However, other 
things may not be equal.  In particular, as noted above, TITF banks also have incentives to hold riskier 
assets, which could have exposed them to greater fair value losses that they might not be willing to 
recognize.  This exposure could offset the otherwise lower incentive to reclassify investments. 
 
2.2 Related Literature 
Our study examines whether the implicit government support for TITF banks affects accounting 
choices permitted following the amendment of IAS 39 in 2008. If there was any doubt whether such 




 The cost of bank bailouts to state treasuries has been so large as to result in sovereign 
debt issues that affect most Western economies, including the US, the UK, and the Eurozone generally 
(Laeven and Valencia, 2010). One major concern long expressed by economists is that the socialization of 
losses creates incentives for TITF banks to take on more risk than otherwise would be the case (Brewer 
and Jagtiani, 2007; Kareken and Wallace, 1978; Stern and Feldman, 2009; Wilson and Wu, 2010).
7
 As 
Admati et al. (2013, 21) explains, “Government guarantees that allow banks to enjoy cheap debt financing 
create numerous distortions and encourage excessive leverage and excessive risk taking.” 
Consistent with the Admati et al. (2013) observation, banks took increasingly risky loan origination 
actions and loaded their balance sheets with risky assets that largely were not present even just a decade 
before the Financial Crisis (e.g., Gorton and Souleles, 2006). These assets included a host of financial 
instruments, such as mortgage-backed securities that lay at the heart of the Financial Crisis (Gorton, 2010; 
Landsman et al., 2008), and over-the-counter derivatives. The growth of such financial instruments led 
accounting standard setters to introduce, over a period of years preceding the Financial Crisis, a series of 
fair value accounting rule changes that applied to all reporting entities, not just banks.
8
  Banks 
subsequently lobbied to modify the accounting standards when prices of their assets tumbled in 2008. 
This fall in asset prices caused Tier 1 regulatory capital to become dangerously low (Paananen et al., 
2012; Ng and Roychowdhury, 2014). Policy makers were left with the difficult task of how best to 
increase bank regulatory capital. As noted above, they did so by bailing out banks—providing effectively 
zero interest loans, and by buying illiquid bank assets through their quantitative easing programs (Laeven 
                                                          
6
 Such bailouts took place in many countries. In the US, Congress passed a $1 trillion bank bailout that resulted in 
taxpayer funds being used to prop up America’s largest banks including Bank of America, Citibank, and Goldman 
Sachs. In the UK, Northern Rock was nationalized, and the Royal Bank of Scotland received bailout funds. In many 
other European countries, notably Ireland, private bank debt was essentially guaranteed by the government. 
7
 For example, in the US, TITF banks gambled with taxpayers’ money by originating loans to risky borrowers and 
purchasing asset-backed securities secured by subprime loans (e.g., Gorton and Metrick, 2012; Gorton and Souleles, 
2006; Greenspan, 1998). 
8
 In the US, such rule changes include recognition of derivatives at fair value (SFAS 133 (FASB, 1998)), a 
measurement standard for fair value (SFAS 157 (FASB, 2006)), and a standard giving firms the option to measure 
certain assets at fair value ((SFAS 159 (FASB, 2007)).  With minor variations, the IASB largely followed suit by 
issuing standards.   
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and Valencia, 2010). Of direct relevance to our study is the fact that banks were also given the 
opportunity to create the appearance of having sufficient regulatory capital by changing the accounting 
rules (via an amendment to IAS 39) that affect how regulatory capital is measured. This cosmetic increase 
in reported regulatory capital reduced pressure on government regulators to act in a way that would have 
had immediate negative implications for government finances.
 
 
Fiechter (2011) and Bischof et al. (2014), using samples of European and worldwide banks applying 
IFRS, respectively, find that one-third of the banks in both samples took advantage of the opportunity to 
reclassify investments. Fiechter (2011) finds that among reclassifying banks, the amounts reclassified 
were, on average, 4% of total assets and 131% of the book value of equity. Such reclassification enabled 
banks to avoid reporting substantial fair value losses, thereby significantly increasing return on assets, 
return on equity, book value of equity and regulatory capital (Fiechter, 2011) and increasing firm-specific 
profits by 44% on average (Bischof et al., 2014). Consistent with the expectation that poorly capitalized 
banks had incentives to reclassify investments from fair value to amortized cost, for a sample of 101 
European banks, Kholmy and Ernstberger (2010) shows that those banks that elected to reclassify 
investments tend to be large, had experienced a deterioration in profitability and stock prices, and were 
located in common law countries. Paananen et al. (2012) also examines the determinants of 
reclassifications by international banks reporting under IFRS and finds that banks with a total regulatory 
capital ratio that is closer to the country’s minimum required ratio and with a larger exposure to fair value 
measurement are more likely to reclassify.  Bischof et al. (2014) highlights that the way in which 
regulatory capital is defined in a given country, in particular whether the country applies a prudential 
filter to total regulatory capital (i.e., Tier 1 and Tier 2), affects reclassification choices. 
Taken together, these studies provide evidence that banks used the flexibility to reclassify 
investments provided by the accounting rule change to improve their reported regulatory capital. 
However, none of these studies examines whether TITF status affected the banks’ accounting 
reclassification choices, particularly whether TITF banks displayed less concern to protect their Tier 1 
capital. Our study addresses this question. Furthermore, our dependent variable, RECLASS, reflects the 
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different ways the three reclassification choices affect Tier 1 regulatory capital, and allows for both 
simultaneity of reclassification choices and country differences in the treatment of fair value losses. 
 
3. PREDICTIONS AND TESTS 
3.1 Costs and Benefits of Reclassification  
Based on the discussion in Section 2, we develop predictions regarding the effect of a bank’s TITF 
status on its incentives to make accounting policy choices that can affect future net income, asset values, 
and equity. Some decisions to reclassify bring a certain benefit that Tier 1 capital is protected from any 
fair value losses associated with retroactive restatement of asset values and any losses that might occur in 
the future. However, such decisions essentially trade these benefits against the cost of foregone future fair 
value gains that would enhance Tier 1 capital and income. We begin by providing predictions regarding 
the costs and benefits of reclassification and how these likely differ for TITF banks. A key assumption 
underlying our predictions is that a bank knows whether it has TITF status. We base this assumption on 
the fact that banks have strong connections with both regulators and politicians (Barth et al., 2012), or are 




Prior to the Financial Crisis, investments that were used by the bank for trading purposes were 
largely required to be classified as HFT. Discretion principally resided in whether to classify the 
remaining investments as AFS or LAR/HTM. The decision of how to allocate investments between these 
two categories reflects the bank’s optimal balancing of various costs and benefits identified earlier.10 
                                                          
9
 Regulators in some countries—in which distressed banks previously had not been allowed to fail—nevertheless 
let some banks fail during the financial crisis. For example, this was true in Russia. The critical question is what 
rational beliefs bank managers were likely to have held when deciding whether to take advantage of the option to 
reclassify investments. It is thus important to avoid introducing ex post bias by classifying a bank as TITF based on 
bank failures subsequent to the reclassification decision. 
10
 We assume that bank managers act on behalf of equity investors when making these decisions. That is, with 
regard to the investment classification decision, we assume there is no substantive goal incongruence between the 
two groups. Our rationale for this assumption is based on the fact that the compensation of bank managers was 
largely comprised of bonuses and equity-based instruments (Becher et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2006; Fahlenbrach and 
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The Financial Crisis altered the relative costs and benefits of classifying investments as HFT, AFS, 
or LAR/HTM. Asset prices fell markedly and there was a decline in liquidity. The decline in asset values 
meant that banks would likely face pressure to recognize losses. However, to the extent that banks could 
claim that declines in value were temporary because of illiquidity of the markets, reclassifying from HFT 
or AFS to LAR/HTM would reduce these pressures. To see this benefit more clearly, consider the 
following scenario. A bank purchased an asset for 100 Euros in 2007, which it classified as AFS. During 
the third quarter of 2008, prices of similar assets declined 40 percent, which suggests the bank should 
recognize a fair value loss of 40 Euros. If the bank were domiciled (not domiciled) in a prudential filter 
country, its fair value loss would be recognized but excluded from (included in) Tier 1 capital. If the bank 
reclassified the asset to LAR/HTM retroactively, the fair value loss would not be recognized, nor would 
an impairment of the newly classified LAR/HTM asset of 100 Euros be required because the bank could 
claim to its auditors the apparent loss in value was temporary. 
More generally, the costs and benefits of reclassifying investments from the various categories, as 
highlighted in Figure 1, can be summarized as follows. The cost of reclassifying an investment from HFT 
or AFS to LAR/HTM is the scrutiny from auditors that might constrain future sales of the reclassified 
assets, regardless of whether a bank is domiciled in a prudential filter country.  For banks in a prudential 
filter country, there is a benefit of reclassifications from HFT to LAR/HTM or AFS arising from both 
Tier 1 capital and net income being shielded from losses, and also a benefit of reclassifying from AFS to 
LAR/HTM arising from comprehensive income being shielded from losses. Banks facing the decision of 
whether to reclassify HFT securities to AFS or LAR/HTM need to consider the benefit of shielding 
comprehensive income afforded by the LAR/HTM category but not the AFS category. Even though 
comprehensive income is not afforded the same prominence as net income, bank managers are likely to 
be concerned about large losses appearing in comprehensive income. However, for banks in a non-
prudential filter country, there is a benefit of reclassifications from HFT to LAR/HTM arising from both 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Stulz, 2011). Rather, bank managers and their equity investors are potentially in conflict with regulators and 
taxpayers. 
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Tier 1 capital and net income being shielded from losses, but there is only a net income benefit for the 
HFT to AFS reclassification; reclassifying from AFS to LAR/HTM shields both Tier 1 capital and 
comprehensive income from losses. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Based on this discussion and findings in prior literature, our first prediction is that, other things 
equal, the more Tier 1 capital a bank had before the reclassification choice, the more it would be able to 
absorb fair value losses, and the less its incentive to reclassify investments. Therefore, other things equal, 
a bank in a prudential filter country with less pre-reclassification Tier 1 regulatory capital is more likely 
to reclassify investments out of HFT to either AFS or LAR/HTM. Similarly, a low capitalized bank in a 
non-prudential filter country is more likely to reclassify investments out of either HFT or AFS to 
LAR/HTM.   
As noted above, TITF status can affect a bank’s reclassification choices. TITF banks are less likely 
to reclassify away from fair value accounting because TITF banks are insulated from at least some of the 
costs associated with fair value losses, but enjoy the full benefits of the effects of upward fair value 
fluctuations on regulatory capital. As a result, we expect the Tier 1 capital effect to be attenuated for TITF 
banks because they likely enjoy more taxpayer protection and regulatory forbearance than non-TITF 
banks. In the context of Figure 1, this discussion implies that Tier 1 capital benefits of reclassification are 
likely to be less for TITF banks; all other costs and benefits are expected, other things equal, to be similar 
for TITF and non-TITF banks. Thus, our second prediction is that in prudential filter countries, TITF 
banks with low Tier 1 capital are less likely to reclassify investments out of HFT to either AFS or 
LAR/HTM than non-TITF banks.  Similarly, in non- prudential filter countries, TITF banks with low Tier 
1 capital are less likely to reclassify investments out of HFT or AFS or LAR/HTM than non-TITF banks. 
3.2 Empirical Model 
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To test our predictions, we develop our empirical model in a way that takes into account two 
important features that underlie banks’ propensity to reclassify investments.  The first is whether a bank is 
domiciled in a prudential filter country.  The second is that banks have multiple choices to make 
depending on the proportions of assets classified in the three investment categories.  For example, as 
described below in section 4, sample banks that reclassify out of HFT to AFS also tend to reclassify out 
of HFT to LAR/HTM and out of AFS to LAR/HTM.  Treating each of these choices independently could 
result in each of the resulting estimating equations being mis-specified.   
To incorporate whether a bank is domiciled in a prudential filter country and to address the 
simultaneous nature of banks’ choices, we estimate a probit regression that expresses a bank’s 
reclassification choice as a function of its regulatory capital position and whether it has TITF status. The 
dependent variable, RECLASS, takes on the values 0 or 1:  
 
𝑅𝐸𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆 = 𝛽′𝑋 + 𝜀 .     (1) 
 
We define RECLASS such that it takes into account whether a bank is domiciled in a prudential filter 
country as follows. For banks in a prudential filter country, RECLASS equals 1 if they reclassify a 
material proportion of investments from HFT to either AFS or LAR/HTM, and 0 otherwise.
11
 For banks 
in a non-prudential filter country, RECLASS equals 1 if they reclassify a material proportion of 
investments from either HFT or AFS to LAR/HTM, and 0 otherwise. In other words, RECLASS 
distinguishes whether a bank protects its regulatory capital as a result of its reclassification choice. 
Defining RECLASS as a composite variable enables it to reflect the different ways the three 
reclassification choices affect regulatory capital, the simultaneity of reclassification choices, and country 
differences in prudential filters. We select probit because the estimation technique takes into account 
econometric problems arising from the fact that a substantial proportion of the banks do not reclassify 
                                                          
11 
Defining RECLASS in this manner, by design, does not permit us to address the question of why banks in 
prudential filter counties choose between AFS and LAR/HTM, where, as noted above, the latter category affords 





 We treat the decision to reclassify and if so how much as a latent variable with unknown 
boundaries concerning the magnitude of the reclassification. As there is no clear a priori way to 
determine the cutoff boundaries, we use a 5% materiality criterion for determining cutoff points when 
estimating the probit model.
13
 
The key explanatory variables, , we use in our probit model are TITF, Pre_Tier1, and TITF
Pre_Tier1.
14
 TITF is an indicator variable that equals 1 for a TITF bank, and 0 otherwise. TITF banks are 
those that enjoy political protection because of their economic importance to the country in which they 
are domiciled. In developing our TITF measure, we do not consider whether a sample bank actually 
received ex post government support because the reclassification choices were based on the bank 
manager’s ex ante belief that the bank has TITF status. Instead, we measure the economic importance of a 
bank to a particular country in two ways. The first way is based on the ratio of the bank’s total assets to 
the country’s GDP at the beginning of 2008. Such banks are of economic importance by virtue of their 
size relative to their domestic economy. We pool all sample banks and rank them based on this ratio and 
select those banks in the top 10% as part of the TITF sample. The 10% cutoff represents banks with total 
assets exceeding 75% of the host country’s GDP. This procedure yields 19 banks.15 The second way is 
based on whether a bank is domiciled in a country in which no distressed bank previously had been 
allowed to fail (Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2008). All banks in such countries enjoy political protection by 
virtue of being located in countries where, history suggests, no bank will be allowed to fail, regardless of 
                                                          
12 
Inferences do not change when using a logit model instead of a probit model. We also considered, but disregarded, 
using a linear probability model, because we encountered the difficulty of obtaining fitted probability estimates 
outside of the [0,1] interval. In particular, although there are no fitted estimates in excess of 1, 7% are less than 0, 
with a largest negative value of -26%. For this reason, all econometric textbooks caution against the use of ordinary 
least squares estimation when the dependent variable is discrete (see, e.g., Wooldridge (2009), pp. 574-575).  
13
 We considered three additional cutoff points: 0%, 2.5%, and 10% of the ex ante HFT and AFS portfolios. 
Untabulated statistics from analyses based on these other cutoff points result in similar inferences to those based on 
tabulated findings. 
14
 The magnitude of the interaction effect in nonlinear models does not equal the marginal effect of the interaction 
term. Therefore, we use the Ai and Norton (2003) correction to estimate the magnitude and standard errors of the 
interaction, TITF Pre_Tier1. 
15
 We also used two cutoff points of 5%, which reduces the number of such banks from 19 to 10, and 15%, which 
increases the number to 33. Estimations of equation (1) based on these alternative cutoff points yield similar 






  This yields 66 additional TITF banks and introduces heterogeneity into the treatment firms with 
respect to their size and operations. 
Based on our analysis of costs and benefits of reclassification, our first prediction is that the greater 
is a bank’s Tier 1 capital before reclassification, the less likely it is to reclassify its investments. 
Therefore, we expect the marginal effect of Pre_Tier1 to be negative. We measure Tier 1 capital as the 
ratio of reported Tier 1 capital, after reversing out effects of any reclassifications on Tier 1 capital, to risk-
weighted assets at the end of 2008, Pre_Tier1. Ideally, we would measure the Tier 1 capital immediately 
before the reclassification decision is made. However, data limitations preclude us from doing so.
17
 Based 
on our second prediction that TITF banks with low regulatory capital were less likely to reclassify 
investments than non-TITF banks with low regulatory capital, we expect the marginal effect of TITF
Pre_Tier1 to be positive. 
We include several control variables when estimating equation (1). The first, Size, which we measure 
as the natural logarithm of total assets (denominated in million Euros) at the beginning of 2008, is 
included to mitigate concerns that TITF merely captures bank size, particularly in the case of those TITF 
banks that are large relative to their host country’s GDP. We make no prediction regarding the sign of its 
coefficient but include it as a general control.
18
 The second, MB, is the bank’s equity market-to-book ratio 
as of June 2008, which is the latest date we can identify as predating the reclassification date for all 
                                                          
16
 We re-estimated equation (1) eliminating banks in countries where banks were subsequently permitted to fail 
(e.g., Russian banks). We also re-estimated equation (1) defining TITF banks as either TBTF or domiciled in a no-
fail country in which no bank was subject to government intervention in 2008. Redefining TITF banks in this way 
allows for the possibility that bank managers in no fail-countries might have revised their expectations regarding the 
likelihood of regulatory forbearance when another bank in their country was subject to government intervention in 
2008 (e.g., UK and Switzerland). Untabulated findings from both analyses reveal no change in our inferences 
relative to those based on tabulated findings. 
17
 Reclassifications took place in the second half of 2008. This suggests that the best we can do is measure the 
determinants in June 2008 by using mid-year financial statements. However, doing so would result in a substantial 
reduction in sample size because either mid-year financial statements are not available or Tier 1 capital disclosures 
are not included in mid-year financial statements for a substantial number of sample banks. Nonetheless, as a 
sensitivity analysis, we re-estimated equation (1) using Tier 1 capital as of June 2008, which reduces the sample 
from 160 to 134 observations.  Untabulated findings yield inferences similar to those based on tabulated findings. 
18
 In addition to the use of Size as control variable, we allow for the possibility that bank size is nonlinearly related 
to RECLASS. We re-estimate equation (1) by replacing TITF with an indicator variable for whether a bank’s assets 
are above or below the sample median. Findings from this additional test in Section 6.1 suggest that our inferences 
are not driven by bank size per se.  
´
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sample banks. We include MB to reflect the capital market’s perception of the health of a bank (Huizinga 
and Laeven 2012), which is potentially correlated with TITF and Pre_Tier1. MB could be correlated with 
TITF because stock prices likely reflect the value of the implicit political protection enjoyed by TITF 
banks. Also, MB could be correlated with Pre_Tier1 because higher capitalized banks are healthier. As 
with Size, we include MB as a general control and make no prediction regarding the sign of its coefficient. 
By construction, banks with higher proportions of HFT and AFS assets before the reclassification 
decision are more likely to reclassify investments from these categories. We therefore include 
Pre_HFT_TA and Pre_AFS_TA, the ratios of total HFT assets and AFS assets before reclassifications to 
total assets at the end of 2008, to control for the possibility that these factors may be correlated with TITF 
and Pre_Tier1. Data limitations preclude us from measuring Pre_HFT_TA and Pre_AFS_TA in June 
2008. To the extent that past profitability is predictive of future profitability, then more profitable banks 
are less likely to reclassify investments, for reasons unrelated to regulation. Therefore, we include 
Pre_ROE, return on shareholders’ equity for 2008 with the effects of any reclassifications removed from 
the numerator (net income), deflated by lagged book value of equity. We include indicator variables for 
whether a bank is a money center bank (Money), a regional bank (Regional), or a savings bank (Savings), 
to allow for the possibility that such banks have incentives to reclassify unrelated to their TITF status and 
level of regulatory capital. We also include indicator variables as controls for differences in size of 
economy (GDPdum), importance of the banking sector (Banks), deposit insurance system (Deposit), and 
legal environment (Legal) (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2008).
19
 We do 
not have predictions for the signs of the country-specific variables. In all analyses, we cluster standard 
errors at the country level. 
 
4. DATA AND SAMPLE 
We obtain the data used in this study from bank annual reports and from Thomson Reuters. Our 
basic sample comprises 249 listed bank holding companies from 34 European countries in which IFRS 
                                                          
19
 Excluding the country indicator variables does not affect our inferences. 
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was applied.
20’21 To be included in our sample, banks had to (i) publish financial statements in English, 
Dutch, French, German, or Italian, (ii) disclose Tier1 capital ratios and risk-weighted assets, and (iii) hold 
investments classified in either the HFT or AFS categories in 2008 before reclassification, (iv) be 
domiciled in a country in which we can determine whether a prudential filter is applied to losses on AFS 
debt investments. The resulting sample used to estimate equation (1) comprises 160 observations. 
Table 1 presents statistics illustrating the relative size of the banking sector in the sample countries, 
the composition of TITF banks by country, and the relative average sizes of TITF and non-TITF banks. 
The number of sample banks differs across countries, ranging from 23 in Italy to only one in seven of the 
smaller countries. Moreover, the importance of the banking sector, as reflected by the ratio of total sample 
bank assets to GDP, varies substantially across countries: the largest ratios are for Belgium (547%), 
Switzerland (459%), Cyprus (437%), and the UK (349%);
22
 the smallest are for Bulgaria (1%), Latvia 
(5%), and Lithuania (6%).
23
 Table 1 also shows whether or not a country has, as part of a failure 
resolution, a recent history of permitting at least one bank to fail (Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2008): 17 (13) 
countries had at least one (no) bank fail before 2003.  
 
                                                          
20
 IFRS are required to be applied by European entities when preparing consolidated financial statements.  In 
principle, financial statements of a holding company’s subsidiaries can be prepared using domestic accounting 
standards of the countries in which they operate. This raises a question of whether accounting choices by a bank’s 
subsidiaries can differ from those of the holding company and if so, whether this can affect inferences from our tests 
as they relate to the effect of prudential filter regulations on accounting choices. Although bank subsidiaries are 
subject to the bank regulations of the country in which they operate, holding companies are subject to the financial 
reporting and prudential filter rules only of the country in which their consolidated financial statements are filed. A 
subsidiary bank operating in a country with different prudential filter rules than those its parent company faces, 
could lead to accounting choices at the subsidiary level being different from those made at the consolidated level. 
However, capital adequacy only matters at the consolidated level because any actions taken by the holding company 
to address capital needs at the subsidiary level are eliminated during the consolidation process (IAS 27, paragraph 
25 (IASB, 2005)). Therefore, our TITF and prudential filter classifications are unaffected by whether bank holding 
companies’ subsidiaries operate in countries other than the one in which the holding company files financial 
statements. 
21
 In several European countries (e.g., Austria, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, and Norway), banks have the option to 
use domestic accounting standards instead of IFRS for regulatory reporting. However, none of the banks in our 
sample uses this option. 
22
 The large relative size of the banking sector in several TITF countries raises the question whether the countries 
could afford to rescue their banks in the event of a systemic failure of the sector. A maintained assumption in this 
study is that, at the time TITF bank managers were making the reclassification choices, they assumed that they 
would be rescued in the event of failure. If this maintained assumption does not apply to bank managers in particular 
countries, predictions regarding the effects of TITF status are less likely to be borne out in our tests.  
23
 The banking sector in many countries also includes non-listed banks, which are not included in our sample. 
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[Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 further reveals the distribution of TITF banks across countries. Several countries, including 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, and Poland have no TITF banks. Other countries, including Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, and Germany have both TITF and non-TITF banks. In these countries, 
sample banks have their TITF status because of their relative size to the local economy. Finally, in 
Cyprus, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, all sample banks are deemed TITF. Table 
1 also reveals that 11 (19) sample countries apply (do not apply) a prudential filter to losses on AFS debt 
investments.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 presents sample descriptive statistics showing the simultaneity of reclassification choices.  It 
reveals, for example, that of the 50 banks that reclassified investments from HFT to LAR/HTM, 38% also 
reclassified investments from HFT to AFS, and 58% also reclassified investments from AFS to 
LAR/HTM.  Furthermore, Table 2 also reveals that the simultaneity of reclassification choices applies 
when there are material reclassifications.  For example, of the 33 banks that reclassified material amounts 
of investments from HFT to LAR/HTM, 24% also reclassified material amounts of investments from 
HFT to AFS, and 33% also reclassified material amounts of investments from AFS to LAR/HTM.  These 
findings underscore the importance of taking into account the simultaneity of the reclassification choices, 
which is a feature of our constructed dependent variable, RECLASS. 
 
 [Table 3 here] 
 
Table 3, Panel A, presents sample summary statistics for the proportion of reclassified assets, 
RECLASS, and the independent variables that appear in the probit estimations, partitioned by TITF and 
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non-TITF banks. The table reveals that the means of the dependent variable, RECLASS, for the TITF and 
non-TITF banks, 0.306 and 0.307, respectively, are insignificantly different. However, this comparison 
masks the propensities to reclassify investments conditional on regulatory capital as well as other bank 
characteristics. 
On average, TITF banks have lower proportions of pre-reclassification Tier 1 capital than non-TITF 
banks, i.e., mean (median) values are 0.096 and 0.117 (0.086 and 0.094).
24
  The two sets of banks differ 
systematically along other dimensions as well.  Notably, TITF banks are larger (mean Size of 10.45 vs. 
9.29), and more TITF banks are money center banks (mean Money of 12% vs. 3%).  In addition, TITF 
banks are more likely to be domiciled in countries that have a history of taking legal action against bank 
managers (mean Legal of 13% vs. 3%).  Regarding the other variables, the differences in means and 
medians are either insignificant or marginally significant.
25
 
Table 3, Panel B, partitions the sample according to whether or not a bank is domiciled in a 
prudential filter country.  The findings reveal that within each regulatory regime, the reclassification 
behavior for TITF and non-TITF banks is not significantly different.  on-TITF banks reclassify at 
approximately six times the rate in non-prudential filter countries than they do in prudential filter 
countries, 0.373 vs. 0.063, and the difference is significant (t-statistic = 2.451). Although TITF banks also 
reclassify at a higher rate in non-prudential filter countries than they do in prudential filter countries, 
0.353 vs. 0.235, the difference is insignificant (t-statistic = 1.148). These findings are consistent with 
TITF banks being less concerned about the regulatory capital implications of reclassifications than non-
TITF banks. 
Table 3, Panel C, partitions the sample according to whether a bank’s pre-reclassification Tier 1 
capital is above or below the sample median. The findings in Panel B reveal there are only marginally 
significant differences in mean and median RECLASS between TITF and non-TITF banks that have 
                                                          
24
 As noted earlier, banks typically maintain Tier 1 capital ratios in excess of the 4% minimum. The fact that both 
TITF and non-TITF banks typically had pre-reclassification ratios above 4% does not imply that bank managers 
regarded the cushions to be sufficient in the volatile conditions of the Financial Crisis.  
25
 Throughout the paper we use a five percent significance level under a one-sided alternative when we have a 
signed prediction and under a two-sided alternative otherwise. 
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regulatory capital below the median, i.e., those banks that have greater regulatory capital incentives to 
reclassify. Likewise, there are no significant differences between the two groups of banks that have 
regulatory capital above the median.  However, more importantly, Panel B’s findings also reveal that a 
bank’s regulatory capital position has no significant effect on its reclassification choices only if it is a 
TITF bank.  In particular, the mean and median differences in RECLASS, 0.125 and 0.000, are 
insignificantly different from zero (t-statistic = 1.239 and Wilcoxon z-statistic = 1.235). In contrast, non-
TITF banks with lower regulatory capital have significantly higher rates of reclassification. In particular, 
the mean and median differences in RECLASS, 0.426 and 1.00, are significantly different from zero (t-
statistic = 4.414 and Wilcoxon z-statistic = 3.949). The findings in Panel C suggest that the 
reclassification choices of TITF and non-TITF banks do differ and are consistent with the hypothesis that 
a bank’s regulatory capital position plays a lessor role if it is a TITF bank. Whether this inference can be 
drawn in a multivariate setting is considered in the next section. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Table 4 presents sample Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal. The table 
reveals that banks that continue to classify investments at fair value tend to have higher Tier 1 capital and 
to be more profitable. For example, the Pearson correlation coefficients between RECLASS and Pre_Tier1 
and between RECLASS and Pre_ROE, –0.212 and –0.162, respectively, are significantly negative. 
Although the correlation coefficient between TITF and RECLASS is insignificant, the coefficient between 
RECLASS and Size, 0.209, is significantly positive. These findings suggest that larger banks tend to be 




Table 5, Panel A, presents probit regression summary statistics associated with estimation of 
equation (1). The table includes coefficients, partial derivatives for Pr(RECLASS = 1) with respect to each 
of the regressors evaluated at sample means, and related heteroscedasticity-robust z-statistics. 
 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
The findings in Table 5, Panel A, reveal inferences consistent with our prediction for non-TITF 
banks. In particular, the coefficient on Pre_Tier1 is significantly negative (coefficient = −27.73; z-statistic 
= −2.92) and the marginal effect, i.e., the partial derivative, associated with probability of reclassifying, 
−7.45, is significantly negative. This implies that, other things equal, for a non-TITF bank, a small 
increase in regulatory capital is associated with a seven-fold decrease in the probability of reclassification. 
Regarding the key interaction variable, TITF Pre_Tier1, its coefficient is significantly positive 
(coefficient = , z-statistic = , and the marginal effect, 5.97, is also significantly positive.26 In 
addition, untabulated findings from a test for the total coefficient on Pre_Tier1 for TITF banks indicate 
that the sum of Pre_Tier1 and TITF Pre_Tier1 (−27.73 + 22.23) is insignificantly different from zero 
= 1.05; p-value = 0.31). These findings indicate that the marginal effect of an increase in regulatory 
capital is essentially zero for a TITF bank.  This contrasts sharply with the greater than seven-fold 
decrease for non-TITF banks.
27
 
                                                          
26
 Ai and Norton (2003) notes that interpretation of coefficients on interaction variables in non-linear models is 
problematic. The marginal effects reported in the table are averages of marginal effects evaluated at each data point.  
The study suggests focusing instead on evaluating marginal effects at points on the distribution, e.g., at the mean or 
median. Marginal effects evaluated at these two points yield the same inferences as those based on the tabulated 
averages. More specifically, marginal effects calculated at the median (mean) are , with t-values of 2.45 
(2.66).  
27
 Another issue relating to the interaction of TITF and Pre_Tier1 concerns the possibility that the marginal response 
of a bank when making its reclassification choice is likely to differ substantially if its regulatory capital is above or 
below a critical threshold. We therefore estimate an alternative version of equation (1) in which we replace the 
continuous Pre_Tier1 variable with a dichotomous, LOW_Pre_Tier1, that equals one if Pre_Tier 1 capital is below 
the sample median, and zero otherwise. Untabulated findings reveal that the LOW_Pre_Tier1 coefficient is 
significantly positive (coefficient = 1.279; z-statistic = 4.63), and the marginal effect, 0.350, is significantly positive 
(z-statistic = 5.09). This finding suggests that non-TITF banks with low regulatory capital are 35% more likely to 





We also estimate versions of equation (1) separately for TITF and non-TITF banks. Doing so 
eliminates the need to include an interaction between TITF and Pre_Tier1—thereby avoiding complexity 
of interpretation of its coefficient (Ai and Norton, 2003)—and relaxes the constraint that the coefficients 
on the control variables are the same for TITF and non-TITF banks. A cost of separate estimations is that 
there is no direct way to compare coefficients between the models. However, for our purposes, separate 
estimations permit us to test for significance of the Pre_Tier1 coefficient for each of the two groups of 
banks.  Table 5, Panel B, reports findings from estimation of equation (1) separately for TITF and non-
TITF banks. For the non-TITF sample, the coefficient on Pre_Tier1 is significantly negative (coefficient 
= −18.47; z-statistic = −2.31), and the marginal effect, −3.88, is also significantly negative. These findings 
indicate that the marginal influence of regulatory capital markedly decreases the propensity of non-TITF 
banks to reclassify. In contrast, for the TITF sample, Panel B of Table 6 reveals that the coefficient on 
Pre_Tier1 is insignificantly different from zero (coefficient = −4.80; z-statistic = −0.104), and the 
marginal effect is also insignificantly different from zero. These findings are consistent with there being 
no influence of Tier 1 capital on the propensity of TITF banks to reclassify. Taken together, these 
findings are consistent with those presented in Panel A. 
Taken together, the findings in Table 5 indicate that pooling together TITF and non-TITF banks 
when analyzing the impact of regulatory capital on the reclassification choice masks the influence of 
regulatory capital for both types of banks. There are, of course, other incentives that affect the 
reclassification choice. Notably, reclassification from either HFT or AFS to LAR/HTM reduces a bank’s 
flexibility to sell the asset before maturity. Because TITF banks have less concern with maintaining their 
regulatory capital position, other things equal, they stand to benefit by avoiding reclassifying assets to 
LAR/HTM.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and LOW_Pre_Tier1 is significantly positive (coefficient = 1.254; z-statistic = 2.97), and the marginal effect, –
0.343, is significantly negative (z-statistic = –2.92). A test for the sum of the coefficients on LOW_Pre_Tier1 and 
the interaction of TITF and LOW_Pre_Tier1 (+1.279 – 1.254) is insignificantly different from zero (χ2-value = 0.00; 
p-value = 0.94). This finding suggests that TITF banks with low regulatory capital are not more likely to reclassify 
than TITF banks with high regulatory capital. 
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  [Table 6 here] 
 
To focus on the flexibility incentive, we consider an additional test that examines the 
reclassification behavior of the 43 banks domiciled in non-prudential filter countries that reclassified 
assets out of HFT to either AFS or LAR/HTM.  Reclassifying assets to the AFS category shields income 
but not regulatory capital; reclassifying assets to the LAR/HTM category shields both income and 
regulatory capital. Because TITF banks have less reason to worry about their regulatory capital position, 
they will be more inclined to reclassify from HFT to AFS than from HFT to LAR/HTM, thereby retaining 
the flexibility to sell assets before maturity. Table 6, which presents findings from this estimation, reveals 
that the TITF coefficient is significantly positive (coefficient = 5.534; z-statistic = 2.53), and the marginal 
effect, 0.595, is significantly positive (z-statistic = 4.04). This finding suggests that TITF banks are 60% 
more likely than non-TITF banks to make the reclassification to the AFS category. Thus, as predicted, 
reclassifications out of HFT for TITF banks are less likely to be motivated to protect regulatory capital. 
Such reclassifications instead appear to be motivated to retain the flexibility to sell assets before maturity. 
 
6. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Although the findings in Tables 5 and 6 are consistent with our predictions, various elements of 
our research design pose inferential problems that we address in this section; in particular the construct 
validity of TITF and the possibility that TITF banks used an alternative accounting tool to protect 
regulatory capital. 
 
6.1 Identification issues associated with TITF status 
In this sub-section, we address the possibility that there are other factors correlated with TITF 
status that determine the accounting reclassification choice, thereby creating econometric identification 
problems and threatening the validity of the TITF construct.  
One identification issue is that the extent to which gains on AFS debt securities are excluded 
from total regulatory capital (i.e., the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital) in certain countries could affect 
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banks’ reclassification choices. Following Bischof et al. (2014), we estimate a version of equation (1) that 
includes a variable that reflects the extent to which AFS gains are excluded from Tier 2 capital. The 
number of available observations for this analysis is 140. Untabulated findings indicate that the 
coefficient on this variable is insignificant (coefficient = −0.534; z-statistic = −0.74) and the coefficients 
on Pre_Tier1, TITF, and TITF Pre_Tier1 are similar in magnitude to those reported in Table 5 and are 
significant; the coefficients (z-statistics) are −24.26 (−2.89), −1.68 (−2.41), and 17.76 (2.59). 
A second potential identification problem is that a bank with a greater proportion of Level 3 
investments has greater ability to manage its Tier 1 regulatory capital because of the discretion afforded to 
managers in determining Level 3 fair values. Other things equal, this would suggest that banks with 
greater proportional holdings of Level 3 investments have less incentive to reclassify.
28
 Thus, if TITF 
banks hold relatively more investments recognized at fair value measured using unobservable inputs, i.e., 
Level 3 investments, than non-TITF banks, they will face less incentive to reclassify their investments to 
LAR/HTM. A third problem is that if TITF banks are more likely than non-TITF banks to hold derivative 
assets for hedging purposes that are prohibited under IAS 39 from being reclassified from fair value 
categories to cost categories, they will be unable to reclassify such assets. In addition, to the extent that 
TITF banks have different risk management strategies than non-TITF banks, these differences likely 
manifest in their having different net hedging derivative positions. A fourth problem is that the decision to 
reclassify could be affected by the extent to which a bank held “crisis-sensitive assets,” i.e., mortgage-
backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, and other related securities that suffered from illiquidity 
during the financial crisis. A fifth problem is that the decision of a bank whether to reclassify is likely to 
be affected by whether it has made use of the fair value option for liabilities; recognizing liabilities at fair 
value could effectively serve as an accounting hedge against fair value gains and losses on assets.
29
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 On the other hand, it is possible that banks with Level 3 investments might have greater incentive to reclassify 
such investments because Level 3 assets are less liquid and possibly more risky. 
29
 Another identification issue that could affect our inferences regarding the effects of TITF status is the possibility 
that TITF banks are more likely than non-TITF banks to have unrealized fair value losses from the second to fourth 
quarter of 2008 that would be directly affected by retroactive reclassifications. Data limitations prevent us from 
directly addressing this issue because such information is not in the public domain. However, we re-estimated 
´
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To address these additional identification problems we include proxy variables for these factors in 
our estimating equation. In particular, we include two Level 3 variables, the ratios of Level 3 HFT assets 
and AFS assets to total assets. We measure these ratios as of fiscal-year-end 2009 because disclosure of 
the fair value hierarchy, i.e., the mix of Level 1, 2, and 3 assets, was not mandated by the IASB’s 
amendment of IFRS 7 before then. We include a variable, the ratio of net hedging derivative position to 
total assets, which we measure at the beginning of 2008, the closest measurement date preceding the 
reclassification date. We include a variable, CRISIS_SENSITIVE, which we measure as the sum of 
mortgage-backed securities, Alt-A investments, collateralized debt obligations, and leveraged finance 
products, divided by total assets, with all amounts as of the beginning of 2008. Lastly, we include an 
indicator variable for whether a bank disclosed in its 2007 fiscal year-end financial statements that it 
made use of the fair value option for liabilities. Including these four variables results in a reduction of 
sample banks from 160 to 148. 
Untabulated findings indicate no significant mean differences in the proportions of Level 3 assets to 
total assets between TITF and non-TITF banks. More specifically, regarding HFT assets, L3_HFT_TA, 
the mean proportion of Level 3 HFT assets is economically small for both TITF and non-TITF banks, 
with means of 0.3% for TITF banks and 0.2% for non-TITF banks (t-statistic for difference in these 
means is 0.53). The corresponding mean proportions for AFS assets, L3_AFS_TA, suggest that TITF 
banks hold an equally small proportion of Level 3 assets as non-TITF banks, 0.4% vs. 0.4% (t-statistic = 
0.14).  
Untabulated findings also indicate no significant mean differences in the net hedging derivative 
positions as a proportion of total assets, NET_HEDGE_TA, between TITF and non-TITF banks. The 
mean proportion of NET_HEDGE_TA is economically small for both TITF and non-TITF banks, with 
means of  for TITF banks and  for non-TITF banks (t-statistic for difference in these 
means is 0.43). Other untabulated findings reveal that although the mean ratio of exposure to crisis-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
equation (1) including unrealized fair value gains or losses for the full fiscal year 2008. Untabulated findings 
indicate that the additional variable’s coefficient is insignificant and, more importantly, inferences regarding TITF 
status are the same as those based on the Table 5 findings. 
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sensitive assets, CRISIS_SENSITIVE, is larger for non-TITF banks than for TITF banks, 1.21% vs. 
1.08%, the difference is not significantly different (t-statistic = 0.176). Lastly, untabulated statistics reveal 
that the proportions of TITF and non-TITF banks exercising the fair value option for liabilities, 
FVOLdum, 45% and 29%, are also not significantly different (t-statistic = 1.37). 
Table 7, Panel A, presents findings from estimation of this expanded version of equation (1) that 
includes the five additional variables. Panel A reveals that the coefficient of L3_AFS_TA is significantly 
positive and that the coefficient on NET_HEDGE_TA is significantly negative. More importantly, 
regarding the identification issue, the coefficients on Pre_Tier1, TITF, and TITF Pre_Tier1 are −35.65, 
−2.36, and 22.89, all of which are similar in magnitude to the values from Table 5 and statistically 
significant. Although inclusion of the additional control variables substantially increases the explanatory 
power of the model (i.e., pseudo R2 is 35% compared to 23% in Table 5), the coefficients on the variables 
of interest, Pre_Tier1, TITF, and TITF Pre_Tier1, remain remarkably similar. This finding suggests 
that the additional variables in Table 7 are uncorrelated with the variables of interest, thereby increasing 
confidence in the inferences we draw. 
Another question relating to construct validity of TITF is whether TITF status is an economic feature 
distinct from bank size. This is a concern because bank size is an element of how we define TITF. 
Although we control for size when estimating equation (1), it is possible that size is nonlinearly related to 
RECLASS.  To address this issue, we re-estimate equation (1) replacing TITF with an indicator variable, 
LARGE, that equals one for banks with bank assets exceeding the sample median, and zero otherwise.
30
 
Findings presented in Table 7, Panel B, indicate that neither the coefficient on LARGE nor its interaction 
with Pre_Tier1 are different from zero (coefficients = –0.378 and 10.499; z-statistics = –0.36 and 0.85). 
These findings are consistent with bank size per se not playing a significant role in a bank’s 
reclassification choice. 
A related concern is that because some TITF banks are domiciled in “no-fail” countries, TITF status 
is correlated with unobserved country-level characteristics.  To address this concern, we estimate two 
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additional probit models. One model includes country fixed effects. The second includes an indicator 
variable that equals one if a bank is domiciled in a common law country because prior research shows that 
accounting choices depend on whether firms are domiciled in common or code law countries (Ball et al. 
2000; Leuz et al. 2003).
31
 Untabulated findings from these additional estimations reveal that inferences 
regarding the influence of TITF status on the reclassification choice are the same as those relating to the 
Table 5 findings.  
6.2 Different kinds of TITF banks 
By construction, TITF is a heterogeneous category that includes TBTF banks domiciled in no-fail 
countries, TBTF banks domiciled in fail countries, non-TBTF banks domiciled in no-fail countries, and 
TBTF banks deemed by bank regulators as “globally systemic,” regardless of whether they are domiciled 
in no-fail countries. Ideally, we would treat each of these types of banks differently in our estimations 
because their incentives to reclassify investments can differ.
32
 However, doing so is precluded by the 
small sample sizes. For example, as noted earlier, there are only 19 TBTF banks in total, 9 of which are 
globally systemic. Within these constraints, we repeat our analyses to assess whether our inferences 
change when some TBTF banks are excluded from the estimations. 
6.2.1 Exclusion of TBTF banks from fail countries 
Because we define a bank as having TITF status either because it is a TBTF bank or is domiciled in a 
no-fail country, one question is whether our inferences regarding TITF status depend on inclusion of 
TBTF banks from fail countries. To answer this question, we re-estimate equation (1) excluding the 9 
TBTF banks from the TITF sample that are not domiciled in no-fail countries. Untabulated findings 
indicate that the coefficients on Pre_Tier1, TITF, and TITF Pre_Tier1 are −24.65, −1.95, and 19.25, 
which are similar in magnitude to those reported in Table 5. The coefficients are all significant (z-
statistics = −2.40, −2.17 and 2.01).  
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 11% of our sample banks are domiciled in the common law countries of Cyprus, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the 
UK. 
32
 For example, untabulated statistics reveal the 66 TITF banks that are not TBTF are significantly better capitalized, 
smaller, and more profitable than the 19 TBTF banks.  The fact that the 66 banks are better capitalized and more 
profitable suggests that they have even less incentive to reclassify investments than the 19 TBTF banks. 
´
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6.2.2 Estimations without SIFI Banks from fail countries 
As noted above, our sample of TITF banks includes banks with global operations. Using the 
definitional classification based on the list of European banks that were deemed as “Globally 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions” (SIFI) by the Financial Stability Board (FSB, 2011), we 
identify 9 SIFI banks that are a subset of the 19 TBTF banks: Dexia, Banco Santander, UBS, HSBC, 
Credit Agricole, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, and BNP Paribas. Another question 
is whether the inferences we draw regarding TITF status are largely attributable to the SIFI banks from 
fail countries. To assess whether this is the case, we re-estimate equation (1) excluding the 6 SIFI banks 
domiciled in fail countries from the sample of TITF banks. Untabulated findings reveal that as with the 
Table 5 findings, the coefficients on TITF and Pre_Tier1 are significantly negative (coefficients = −2.04, 
−27.98; z-statistics = −2.35, −2.94), and the TITF Pre_Tier1 coefficient is significantly positive 
(coefficient = 22.23, z-statistic = 2.47). Thus, excluding SIFI banks from fail countries has no effect on 
our inferences. 
6.3 Did TITF banks provision less for loan losses? 
One plausible alternative explanation for TITF not electing to reclassify investments to protect 
regulatory capital is that they used other accounting choices that were less costly to use. A prime 
candidate is discretionary loan loss provisioning. Provisioning is advantageous because loans comprise a 
larger proportion of most banks’ assets and therefore small adjustments can have big effects on regulatory 
capital positions. In addition, loan loss provisioning is subjective and therefore vulnerable to managerial 
discretion. In contrast, reclassification is more visible and can be interpreted as a negative signal 
regarding the bank’s financial health. The possibility therefore arises that failure to observe TITF banks 
reclassifying less than non-TITF banks is attributable not to their lack of concern over regulatory capital 
but rather because they have a more effective and less costly means of protecting it. If this is the case, 
then we should observe TITF banks making relatively smaller discretionary loan loss provisions in 2008. 
To explore this possibility, we calculate discretionary loan loss provisions for all sample banks in 
2008 using the Beatty et al. (2002) methodology. In particular, we use the residuals from a cross-sectional 
´
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regression of the 2008 loan loss provision as a fraction of the average of beginning and ending loans on 
various determinants of risk of loan loss, including change in non-performing loans and the beginning-of-
year loan loss allowance as a fraction of total loans. Untabulated statistics reveal that mean (median) 
discretionary loan loss provisions for TITF and non-TITF banks are 0.15% (–0.15%) and –0.17% (–
0.28%), and that the mean (median) difference between the two groups is significant, with an associated t-
statistic of –2.21 (–1.98). These findings suggest that not only did TITF banks not have smaller 
discretionary loan loss provisions in 2008, but if anything, they had larger ones.
33
    
 
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In 2008, the IASB permitted banks to reclassify investments retroactively from fair value to cost 
categories.  In this study, we hypothesize that because TITF banks were more likely to enjoy political 
protection and regulatory forbearance in the event of a regulatory capital shortfall, the incentive to 
reclassify investments to protect regulatory capital was less for TITF than for non-TITF banks. To test 
this prediction, we estimate a probit regression using a dependent variable, RECLASS, that is a composite 
variable that captures the different ways the three reclassification choices affect regulatory capital, the 
simultaneity of reclassification choices, and country differences in prudential filters.  Findings are 
consistent with the prediction of a moderating influence of TITF status on the incentive to reclassify 
investments for banks with lower regulatory capital. In particular, we find that while a small marginal 
change in regulatory capital has a between five- and seven-fold decrease in the probability of 
reclassification for non-TITF banks, there is no effect on the reclassification choice for TITF banks.  
To focus more directly on the effect of TITF status on the tradeoff banks make between 
protecting regulatory capital and retaining flexibility to sell assets, we examine the accounting 
reclassification choices made by the subsample of banks from non-prudential filter countries that 
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 Furthermore, untabulated statistics relating to total loan loss provisions, i.e., the sum of discretionary and non-
discretionary components, reveal the similar inference that TITF banks did not make smaller loan loss provisions in 
2008.  
 33 
reclassify out of the held-for-trading category. We find that TITF banks are more likely to reclassify out 
of the held-for-trading category into the available-for-sale category than non-TITF banks, which is 
consistent with TITF banks placing more weight on retaining flexibility to sell the assets rather than 
protecting their regulatory capital. 
It is difficult to rule out definitively that remaining construct and internal validity issues affect the 
inferences we draw. There are many differences between TITF banks and non-TITF banks unrelated to 
bailout incentives that cannot be explored because of sample size limitations. Nonetheless, findings from 
additional analyses we can conduct indicate that our inferences generally are robust to alternative 
explanations and estimation techniques. 
Taken together, our study’s findings provide evidence that accounting choices made by managers 
are affected by the importance of their firms to the economies in which they are domiciled. In particular, 
whereas non-TITF banks’ accounting choices were largely influenced by regulatory concerns, by virtue of 
their unique status, TITF banks were relatively free from regulatory concerns when making accounting 
choices, thereby permitting them to place more weight on retaining flexibility to sell the assets rather than 
protecting their regulatory capital. 
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FIGURE 1  




HFT_to_LAR/HTM Selling restrictions & future fair value gains in Tier 1 Tier 1 & Net income
HFT_to_AFS Future fair value gains in Tier 1 Tier 1 & Net income
AFS_to_LAR/HTM Selling restrictions Comprehensive income
Non-prudential filter country
Costs Benefits
HFT_to_LAR/HTM Selling restrictions & future fair value gains in Tier 1 Tier 1 & Net income
HFT_to_AFS Future fair value gains in Tier 1 Net income
AFS_to_LAR/HTM Selling restrictions Tier1 & Comprehensive income
This figure presents the costs and benefits of the three different reclassification decisions across prudential filter and non-prudential 
filter countries. HFT, AFS, LAR, and HTM are assets in the category "held for trading", "available for sale", "loans and receivables", 
and "held to maturity", respectively. In prudential (non-prudential) filter countries, unrealized losses on AFS debt securities are 
excluded (not excluded) from the calculation of Tier 1 capital. Unrealized gains are always excluded from Tier 1 regardless of 
whether the country applies a prudential filter or not (CEBS 2007). 
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TABLE 1 











Filter # of Banks



















Austria 272'010 yes no 8 141% 1 74% 0 − 7 10%
Belgium 335'085 yes yes 3 547% 3 182% 0 − 0 −
Bosnia and Herzegovina 21'759 yes no 1 174% 1 174% 0 − 0 −
Bulgaria 60'185 yes no 1 1% 0 − 0 − 1 1%
Croatia 43'404 yes no 5 64% 0 − 0 − 5 13%
Cyprus 15'879 no no 3 437% 2 195% 1 46% 0 −
Czech Republic 132'967 yes yes 1 19% 0 − 0 − 1 19%
Denmark 226'844 yes no 5 212% 1 198% 0 − 4 3%
Finland 179'702 no no 2 16% 0 − 2 8% 0 −
France 1'895'284 yes yes 5 248% 2 82% 0 − 3 28%
Germany 2'432'400 yes no 14 152% 1 83% 0 − 13 5%
Greece 226'437 no no 10 153% 0 − 10 15% 0 −
Hungary 100'789 yes no 2 36% 0 − 0 − 2 18%
Ireland 194'083 no yes 2 193% 2 97% 0 − 0 −
Italy 1'546'177 yes no 23 148% 0 − 0 − 23 6%
Kazakhstan 72'804 no no 4 44% 0 − 4 11% 0 −
Latvia 21'218 yes no 1 5% 0 − 0 − 1 5%
Lithuania 28'577 yes no 2 6% 0 − 0 − 2 3%
Netherlands 568'664 no yes 2 5% 0 − 2 3% 0 −
Norway 286'143 no yes 10 84% 0 − 10 8% 0 −
Poland 327'262 yes yes 10 39% 0 − 0 − 10 4%
Portugal 168'737 no no 5 125% 0 − 5 25% 0 −
Romania 115'020 yes yes 1 10% 0 − 0 − 1 10%
Russia 926'712 no no 7 28% 0 − 7 4% 0 −
Slovakia 61'547 yes yes 1 15% 0 − 0 − 1 15%
Spain 1'052'730 no no 8 168% 1 87% 7 12% 0 −
Sweden 330'812 no yes 5 304% 1 75% 4 57% 0 −
Switzerland 314'815 no no 8 459% 1 436% 7 3% 0 −
Turkey 491'967 yes no 1 9% 0 − 0 − 1 9%
United Kingdom 1'904'621 no yes 10 349% 3 103% 7 6% 0 −
Total 14'354'632 yes: 13 yes: 11 160 173% 19 95% 66 6% 75 10%
no: 17 no: 19
(A): Aggregate country statistics (B): TITF banks (C): Non-TITF banks
This table presents country summary statistics for European banks with non-zero holdings in both assets held for trading (HFT) and assets available for sale (AFS). Column (A) shows
aggregate country statistics, whereas Columns (B) and (C) show country mean statistics for TITF and non-TITF banks, respectively. A bank is defined as TITF if the bank is either too-
big-to-fail (TBTF ) or domiciled in a country with no Fail History . TBTF is equal to 1 if the bank's total assets at the beginning of 2008 relative to its local GDP falls whithin the top 10
percent of all sample banks, and 0 otherwise. Fail History is equal to 1 if the respective country historically (i.e., before 2003) let fail banks as part of failure resolution (source: database of
Demirgüc-Kunt et al. [2008]), and 0 otherwise. Prudential Filter is equal to 1 if the country excludes unrealized fair values losses on AFS debt securities from the calculation of Tier 1




Simultaneity of Reclassifications of European Banks 
  
Overlap of reclassifications (in %)
N HFT_to_LAR/HTM HFT_to_AFS AFS_to_LAR/HTM
HFT_to_LAR/HTM 50 − 38% 58%
HFT_to_AFS 30 63% − 50%
AFS_to_LAR/HTM 42 45% 36% −
Overlap of material reclassifications (in %)
N HFT_to_LAR/HTM HFT_to_AFS AFS_to_LAR/HTM
HFT_to_LAR/HTM 33 − 24% 33%
HFT_to_AFS 18 44% − 11%
AFS_to_LAR/HTM 32 34% 6% −
    The table reports the overlap of different (material) reclassification choices. HFT, AFS, LAR, and HTM are assets in the 
category "held for trading", "available for sale", "loans and receivables", and "held to maturity", respectively. HFT_to_LAR/HTM 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a bank reclassifies out of HFT into LAR or HTM, and 0 otherwise. HFT_to_AFS  is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a bank reclassifies out of HFT into AFS, and 0 otherwise. 
AFS_to_LAR/HTM  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a bank reclassifies out of AFS into LAR or HTM. We consider 




Sample Descriptive Statistics  
 
  
Panel A: Summary statistics for the full sample





RECLASS 0.306 0.000 0.307 0.000 0.011 0.011
Pre_Tier1 0.096 0.086 0.117 0.094 1.844* 0.792
MB 1.356 1.370 1.359 1.215 0.028 -0.446
Size 10.449 10.097 9.294 9.289 -3.495*** -3.041***
Pre_ROE 0.021 0.076 0.034 0.057 0.442 -0.234
Pre_HFT_TA 0.093 0.036 0.108 0.046 0.628 0.074
Pre_AFS_TA 0.065 0.048 0.087 0.051 1.399 0.501
GDPdum 0.518 1.000 0.667 1.000 1.921* 1.905*
Banks 0.659 1.000 0.760 1.000 1.402 1.398
Deposit 0.482 0.000 0.387 0.000 -1.216 -1.214
Legal 0.129 0.000 0.027 0.000 -2.402** -2.366**
Money 0.118 0.000 0.027 0.000 -2.209** -2.184**
Regional 0.564 1.000 0.600 1.000 0.471 0.472
Savings 0.234 0.000 0.253 0.000 0.289 0.290
Prudential filter country Mean Median Mean Median t-stat z-stat
RECLASS 0.235 0.000 0.063 0.000 -1.486 -1.469
Non-prudential filter country Mean Median Mean Median
RECLASS 0.353 0.000 0.373 0.000 0.215 0.216
Tests on Differences t-stat z-stat t-stat z-stat
RECLASS 1.148 1.146 2.451** 2.372**
 85 TITF Banks 75 Non-TITF Banks Tests on Differences
 34 TITF Banks 16 Non-TITF Banks Tests on Differences
 51 TITF Banks 59 Non-TITF Banks
Panel B: Sample partitioning by prudential filter country
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
 
 
Below median Tier 1 Mean Median Mean Median t-stat z-stat
RECLASS 0.362 0.000 0.545 1.000 1.637 1.621 
Above median Tier 1 Mean Median Mean Median
RECLASS 0.237 0.000 0.119 0.000 -1.384 -1.379 
Tests on Differences t-stat z-stat t-stat z-stat
RECLASS 1.239 1.235 4.415*** 3.949***
 38 TITF Banks 42 Non-TITF Banks
 This table presents tests on the differences in means and medians between TITF and non-TITF banks. While Panel A 
presents test statistics for the full sample, Panel B shows the results when partitioning the sample in prudential filter and non-
prudential filter countries. Panel C partitions the sample by banks with below and above median (pre-reclassification) Tier 1 
capital. HFT, AFS, LAR, and HTM are assets in the category "held for trading", "available for sale", "loans and receivables", 
and "held to maturity", respectively. 
   A bank is defined as TITF  if the bank is either too-big-to-fail (TBTF ) or domiciled in a country with no Fail History . 
TBTF  is equal to 1 if the bank's total assets at the beginning of 2008 relative to its local GDP falls whithin the top 10 percent 
of all sample banks, and 0 otherwise. Fail History  equals 1 if the respective country historically (i.e., before 2003) let fail 
banks as part of failure resolution (source: database of Demirgüc-Kunt et al. [2008]), and 0 otherwise. 
    For a bank in a prudential filter country, RECLASS  equals 1 if it reclassified a material proportion of investments from 
HFT to either AFS or LAR/HTM, and 0 otherwise. For a bank in a non-prudential filter country, RECLASS equals 1 if it 
reclassified a material proportion of investments from either HFT or AFS to LAR/HTM, and 0 otherwise. We consider 
reclassified amounts as material if the proportion of reclassified assets to the ex ante portfolio (i.e., HFT or AFS) is above 5 
percent.  
    Pre_Tier1 is the Tier 1 capital ratio excluding any reclassification effects on both Tier 1 capital and risk-weighted assets 
at the end of 2008. MB is defined as the ratio of market capitalization to book value of equity as of 30 June 2008. Size  is 
defined as the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of 2008. Pre_ROE is the net income in 2008 excluding 
reclassification effects on net income, scaled with book value of equity at the beginning of 2008. Pre_HFT_TA 
(Pre_AFS_TA ) is the HFT (AFS) portfolio before reclassifications as a percentage of total assets at the end of 2008. 
GDPdum  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the GDP of the bank's local country is above the median, and 0 otherwise. 
Banks is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the number of banks whithin a country is above the sample median, and 0 
otherwise. Deposit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the deposit insurance index by Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2002) is above the median, and 0 otherwise. Legal  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank's local country has at least 
once taken legal action against bank managers, and 0 otherwise (source: database of Demirgüc-Kunt et al. 2008). Money , 
Regional , and Savings  are sub-industry indicator variables for whether a bank is a money center bank, regional bank, or a 
savings bank. 
     ***, **, and * indicate that the means (medians) are significantly different at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, 
using a two-sided t-test (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). 
Panel C: Sample partitioning by below and above median Tier 1 capital
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TABLE 4 
Sample Correlations 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15]
[1] RECLASS 1 -0.001 -0.343*** -0.113 0.242*** -0.264*** 0.336*** 0.057 -0.104 0.101 -0.149* -0.148* 0.120 -0.005 -0.039
[2] TITF -0.001 1 -0.052 -0.020 0.185** -0.005 -0.023 -0.036 -0.199** -0.173** 0.061 0.208*** 0.169** -0.036 -0.022
[3] Pre_Tier1 -0.212*** -0.145* 1 0.130* -0.379*** 0.263*** -0.292*** -0.028 0.070 -0.152** 0.085 -0.098 -0.073 -0.065 -0.029
[4] MB -0.109 -0.002 0.061 1 -0.041 0.340*** -0.100 0.181** 0.098 0.061 -0.046 0.028 -0.009 -0.003 -0.024
[5] Size 0.209*** 0.268*** -0.285*** -0.108 1 -0.069 0.505*** 0.230*** 0.321*** 0.062 -0.133* 0.153** 0.216*** 0.084 -0.112
[6] Pre_ROE -0.162** -0.035 0.106 0.229*** -0.168** 1 -0.227*** -0.009 -0.031 -0.128* 0.160** 0.109 0.041 -0.006 0.047
[7] Pre_HFT_TA 0.129 -0.050 -0.169** -0.055 0.431*** -0.283*** 1 0.068 0.321*** 0.152** -0.030 0.027 0.160** -0.028 -0.013
[8] Pre_AFS_TA 0.064 -0.111 0.123 0.136* 0.146* -0.098 0.160** 1 0.132* -0.101 -0.149* 0.254*** 0.104 0.104 -0.177**
[9] GDPdum -0.104 -0.151* 0.065 0.078 0.311*** -0.083 0.248*** 0.124 1 0.383*** -0.253*** 0.126 0.034 0.084 -0.217***
[10] Banks 0.101 -0.111 0.020 0.020 -0.008 -0.083 0.010 -0.133 0.324*** 1 -0.369*** -0.116 -0.033 -0.115 0.105
[11] Deposit -0.149* 0.096 -0.037 -0.018 -0.176** 0.107 -0.079 -0.044 -0.310*** -0.455*** 1 0.257*** -0.111 -0.053 0.190**
[12] Legal -0.148* 0.188** -0.072 0.048 0.227*** 0.004 0.046 0.326*** 0.126 -0.116 0.257*** 1 0.058 0.112 -0.136*
[13] Money 0.120 0.172** -0.073 0.012 0.271*** -0.055 0.153** 0.037 0.034 -0.033 -0.111 0.058 1 -0.339*** -0.163**
[14] Regional -0.005 -0.048 -0.136* 0.010 0.029 0.093 -0.080 0.027 0.084 -0.115 -0.053 0.112 -0.339*** 1 -0.665***
[15] Savings -0.039 -0.007 0.011 -0.073 -0.104 0.045 -0.030 -0.124 -0.217*** 0.105 0.189** -0.136* -0.163** -0.665*** 1
This table reports pearson (spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal. See Table 3 for the definition of the variables. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided).
 TABLE 5 
Results of Probit Regression 
  







TITF − -2.057** -0.553**
(-2.53) (-2.50)
Pre_Tier1 − -27.726*** -7.451***
(-2.92) (-3.05)
TITF x Pre_Tier1 + 22.226*** 5.973**
(2.58) (2.51)
MB ? -0.143 -0.038
(-0.82) (-0.81)
Size ? 0.148* 0.040**
(1.89) (1.97)
Pre_ROE − -0.209 -0.056
(-0.33) (-0.33)
Pre_HFT_TA + -0.232 -0.062
(-0.25) (-0.25)
Pre_AFS_TA + 3.692** 0.992**
(2.30) (2.41)
GDPdum ? -0.662** -0.178**
(-1.99) (-2.17)
Banks ? 0.574 0.154
(1.49) (1.50)
Deposit ? 0.164 0.044
(0.40) (0.40)
Legal ? -1.781** -0.479**
(-2.10) (-2.13)
Money ? 0.152 0.041
(0.38) (0.37)
Regional ? -0.150 -0.040
(-0.47) (-0.48)


























Pre_Tier1 ? -4.797 -1.359 − -18.471** -3.879**
(-1.04) (-1.13) (-2.31) (-2.22)
MB ? -0.434* -0.123* ? 0.280 0.059
(-1.87) (-1.65) (0.91) (0.93)
Size ? 0.142 0.040 ? 0.249** 0.052**
(1.05) (1.05) (2.23) (2.21)
Pre_ROE − 1.857* 0.526* − -3.355** -0.705**
(1.79) (1.96) (-2.20) (-2.47)
Pre_HFT_TA + -0.914 -0.259 + 0.058 0.012
(-0.37) (-0.37) (0.04) (0.04)
Pre_AFS_TA + 2.244 0.636 + 1.010 0.212
(0.67) (0.71) (0.49) (0.47)
GDPdum ? -1.099** -0.311*** ? -0.583 -0.123
(-2.29) (-3.01) (-1.39) (-1.34)
Deposit ? -0.423 -0.120 ? -0.314 -0.066
(-0.93) (-0.89) (-0.43) (-0.44)
Regional ? -0.459 -0.130 ? -0.811 -0.170
(-1.30) (-1.36) (-1.37) (-1.46)
Savings ? -0.502 -0.142 ? -1.009 -0.212*





(B): Non-TITF banks(A): TITF banks
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This table reports probit coefficient estimates, marginal effects, and z-statistics based on robust
standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. HFT, AFS, LAR, and HTM are assets in the
category "held for trading", "available for sale", "loans and receivables", and "held to maturity",
respectively. Panel A reports the results for the full sample, while Panel B presents the results for TITF
and non-TITF banks separately. For a bank in a prudential filter country, RECLASS equals 1 if it
reclassified a material proportion of investments from HFT to either AFS or LAR/HTM, and 0 otherwise.
For a bank in a non-prudential filter country, RECLASS equals 1 if it reclassified a material proportion of
investments from either HFT or AFS to LAR/HTM, and 0 otherwise. We consider reclassified amounts as
material if the proportion of reclassified assets to the ex ante portfolio (i.e., HFT or AFS) is above 5
percent.   
     A bank is defined as TITF if the bank is either too-big-to-fail (TBTF ) or domiciled in a country with no 
Fail History. TBTF is equal to 1 if the bank's total assets at the beginning of 2008 relative to its local
GDP falls whithin the top 10 percent of all sample banks, and 0 otherwise. Fail History equals 1 if the
respective country historically (i.e., before 2003) let fail banks as part of failure resolution (source:
database of Demirgüc-Kunt et al. [2008]), and 0 otherwise. Pre_Tier1 is the Tier 1 capital ratio
excluding any reclassification effects on both Tier 1 capital and risk-weighted assets at the end of 2008.
TITF x Pre_Tier1  is an interaction term between TITF  and Pre_Tier1 . 
MB is defined as the ratio of market capitalization to book value of equity as of 30 June 2008. Size  is 
defined as the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of 2008. Pre_ROE is the net income in
2008 excluding reclassification effects on net income, scaled with book value of equity at the beginning of
2008. Pre_HFT_TA (Pre_AFS_TA ) is the HFT (AFS) portfolio before reclassifications as a percentage
of total assets at the end of 2008. Money , Regional , and Savings  are sub-industry indicator variables for 
whether a bank is a money center bank, regional bank, or a savings bank. GDPdum is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the GDP of the bank's local country is above the median, and 0 otherwise. Banks is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the number of banks whithin a country is above the sample median, and 0 
otherwise. Deposit  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the deposit insurance index by Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002) is above the median, and 0 otherwise. Legal is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
bank's local country has at least once taken legal action against bank managers, and 0 otherwise (source:
database of Demirgüc-Kunt et al. 2008).  
    ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided).
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TABLE 6 
Held for Trading (HFT) to Available for Sale (AFS) Reclassifications in Non-prudential Filter Countries 
   






TITF − 5.534** 0.595***
(2.53) (4.04)
MB ? 2.565 0.276**
(1.62) (2.28)
Size ? -0.501*** -0.054***
(-4.50) (-2.98)
Pre_ROE − -1.463 -0.157
(-0.45) (-0.48)
Pre_HFT_TA + 3.829 0.412
(1.01) (1.05)
Pre_AFS_TA + -40.272* -4.328***
(-1.96) (-3.23)
GDPdum ? -5.645* -0.607***
(-1.88) (-3.03)
Banks ? -0.691 -0.074
(-0.92) (-1.02)






This table reports probit coefficient estimates, marginal effects, and z -statistics based on robust standard
errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. HFT, AFS, LAR, and HTM are assets in the category
"held for trading", "available for sale", "loans and receivables", and "held to maturity", respectively. The
sample includes banks from non-prudential filter countries that reclassify out of HFT. The dependent variable
equals 1 (0) if the bank reclassifies from HFT to AFS (HFT to LAR/HTM).
A bank is defined as TITF if the bank is either too-big-to-fail (TBTF ) or domiciled in a country with no
Fail History. TBTF is equal to 1 if the bank's total assets at the beginning of 2008 relative to its local GDP
falls whithin the top 10 percent of all sample banks, and 0 otherwise. Fail History equals 1 if the respective
country historically (i.e., before 2003) let fail banks as part of failure resolution (source: database of
Demirgüc-Kunt et al. [2008]), and 0 otherwise. See Table 3 for the definition of the other variables. 
    ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided).
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TABLE 7 
Fair Value Controls and Bank Size 
 
(continued)  







TITF − -2.360** -0.523**
(-2.28) (-2.23)
Pre_Tier1 − -35.651*** -7.899***
(-2.78) (-2.85)
TITF x Pre_Tier1 + 22.889** 5.071**
(1.99) (2.00)
MB ? -0.178 -0.040
(-0.79) (-0.79)
Size ? 0.232*** 0.051***
(2.98) (3.03)
Pre_ROE − 0.180 0.040
(0.22) (0.22)
Pre_HFT_TA + 0.555 0.123
(0.48) (0.49)
Pre_AFS_TA + 4.996** 1.107***
(2.53) (2.65)
GDPdum ? -0.888** -0.197**
(-2.02) (-2.06)
Banks ? 0.414 0.092
(0.95) (0.95)
Deposit ? 0.269 0.059
(0.61) (0.60)
Legal ? -3.375*** -0.748***
(-3.60) (-3.81)
Money ? -0.352 -0.078
(-0.79) (-0.82)
Regional ? -0.946*** -0.210***
(-2.91) (-3.38)
Savings ? -1.233** -0.273**
(-2.30) (-2.49)
L3_HFT_TA ? -36.351 -8.054
(-0.84) (-0.86)
L3_AFS_TA ? 37.822*** 8.380***
(3.29) (3.36)
NET_HEDGE_TA − -134.195** -29.733**
(-2.28) (-2.43)
FVOLdum − -0.375 -0.083
(-1.43) (-1.41)






















LARGE ? -0.378 -0.104 -0.426 -0.117
(-0.36) (-0.36) (-0.38) (-0.39)
Pre_Tier1 − -16.485 -4.528* -16.450 -4.516
(-1.53) (-1.67) (-1.51) (-1.64)
LARGE x Pre_Tier1 ? 10.499 2.884 10.537 2.893
(0.85) (0.88) (0.85) (0.88)
Size ? 0.015 0.004
(0.13) (0.13)
MB ? -0.244 -0.067 -0.239 -0.066
(-1.50) (-1.46) (-1.54) (-1.50)
Pre_ROE − -0.336 -0.092 -0.342 -0.094
(-0.55) (-0.54) (-0.57) (-0.56)
Pre_HFT_TA + 0.116 0.032 0.085 0.023
(0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10)
Pre_AFS_TA + 3.493** 0.959** 3.475** 0.954**
(2.20) (2.38) (2.24) (2.44)
GDPdum ? -0.552** -0.151** -0.558** -0.153**
(-1.97) (-2.15) (-1.99) (-2.16)
Banks ? 0.652* 0.179* 0.658* 0.181*
(1.77) (1.84) (1.77) (1.84)
Deposit ? 0.058 0.016 0.066 0.018
(0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17)
Legal ? -1.650** -0.453** -1.664** -0.457**
(-2.08) (-2.21) (-2.05) (-2.16)
Money ? 0.342 0.094 0.330 0.091
(0.83) (0.82) (0.77) (0.76)
Regional ? -0.118 -0.032 -0.112 -0.031
(-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.37) (-0.37)
Savings ? -0.400 -0.110 -0.405 -0.111











The table presents probit coefficient estimates, marginal effects, and z-statistics based on robust standard errors
clustered at the country level in parentheses. In Panel A, L3_HFT_TA is the proportion of Level 3 HFT assets to total
assets. L3_AFS_TA is the proportion of Level 3 AFS assets to total assets. NET_HEDGE_TA is the proportion of
positive replacement values minus negative replacement values of hedging derivatives relative to total assets. FVOLdum  is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the bank applies the FVO on its liabilities, and 0 otherwise. CRISIS_SENSITIVE  is 
the sum of mortgage-backed securities, Alt-A investments, collateralized debt obligations, and leveraged finance products,
divided by total assets, with all amounts as of the beginning of 2008.
In Panel B, we replace TITF with an indicator variable LARGE that equals 1 if total assets are above the sample
median, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 3.
     ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided).
